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Introduction 
Since the beginning of the Ethiopian situation with the Wal Wal incident in 
December 1934, it was only from early September 1935 that the League of 
Nations began to seriously address Italian aggression against Ethiopia. Ironi-
cally, it was in the middle of the League߈s efforts that Italy, without formally 
declaring war, launched a full-scale attack on October 3. By May 7, 1936, 
Ethiopia had been defeated. It is generally agreed that the invasion of Ethiopia 
was the consequence of a long-standing interest in establishing an Italian 
stronghold in East Africa. However, when it attacked in 1935, Italy apparent-
ly stood to gain nothing perhaps beyond the revenge of 1896, for other 
powers already acknowledged that Ethiopia was in its sphere of influence.1 
Benito Mussolini, it has been argued, was inhibited from launching the 
military invasion of Ethiopia in 1932 by ߋalarm at the resurgence of a Ger-
man nationalism increasingly located in the Nazi movementߌ.2 But 1935 
was no more auspicious from the point of view of German national resur-
gence: it was in March 1935 that Germany announced the re-introduction of 
conscription, and Hitler acknowledged the existence of the Luftwaffe. The-
se openly challenged Versailles and threatened the security of Europe. True, 
Britain and France virtually endorsed Italian action in Ethiopia ostensibly 
as compensation for Italian commitment to the Stresa Front, a support that 
provided a favourable international environment, yet there was no tangible 
interest to be served: ߋMussolini was concerned to show off Italy߈s strength, 
not to acquire the practical gains (if any such exist) of Empireߌ.3 
Ethiopia in 1935 had become a responsible member of the international 
community. It was a member of the League of Nations and consequently 
entitled to respect for its sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-aggressive 
conduct towards it and action against aggression from fellow members. 
Mussolini߈s intentions were not unknown to the major powers, but none 
 
1 TAYLOR, 1964, 119߃121. 
2 CASSELS, 1999, 61. 
3 TAYLOR, 1964, 128. 
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appeared willing to prevent the inevitable. There seemed to have been a 
consensus that Ethiopia did not deserve to be treated as an equal member of 
the League. At least, Britain did not think Ethiopia sufficiently civilized to 
be a member of the League in 1925.4 And at the meeting of the League 
Council on September 4, 1935, the Italian representative did not think Ethi-
opia should be ߋconsidered a civilized sovereign stateߌ.5  
Behind Anglo߃French complicity and Italian determination was the race 
element usually concealed in the notion of the civilizing mission: Ethiopians 
being non-white and African were racially inferior and in need of civilization. 
No other justification was needed for any action against them. Italian Fas-
cism, like German Nazism, was after all a racial philosophy.6 ߋFor the Popeߌ, 
Mussolini had asserted, ߋsouls have no color, but for us faces have colorߌ.7 
Pressured by the claim of Nordic racism that Italian blood was tainted by 
Negro blood and therefore not pure, Mussolini was driven to adopt an ex-
treme form of anti-Africanism that inferiorized Africans, and designed to 
bolster Italian racial pride. Thus, even though he argued that ߋwhen a people 
becomes conscious of its own racial identity, it does so in relation to all the 
races, not of one aloneߌ, he specified that ߋWe became racially conscious only 
in the face of the Hamites, that is to say, the Africansߌ.8 The legal instrument 
for achieving this goal was the racial decree of August 5, 1936. For the Fascist 
elite generally, Ethiopia was ߋnothing but a collection of heterogeneous tribes 
dominated by various primitive chieftainsߌ, where tribal wars were endemic 
and slavery a national institution.9 This was the Ethiopia that Italy had com-
mitted itself to civilizing. By motivation, therefore, the Italian invasion of 
Ethiopia was racial, and it was a racial interpretation that the non-Caucasian 
world, Asian and African, gave to it.10 It is in this context that the African-
American response should be understood. 
The Italo߃Ethiopian Crisis has been described as ߋsome sort of tangible ߃ 
certainly a legitimate issue ߃ around which the black nationalist could rally, 
and indeed rally a great section of the black populationߌ.11 Ottley in fact as-
serts that he knows of ߋno event in recent times that stirred the rank and file 
of Negroes more than the Italo߃Ethiopian warߌ.12 African-Americans were 
 
 4 Ibid., 119. 
 5 LEONARD, 1951, 147. 
 6 KALLIS, 2000, 45. 
 7 GILLETTE, 2002, 57. 
 8 Ibid., 58. 
 9 HIBBERT, 1962, 69. 
10 See PLUMMER, 1996, 50. 
11 OTTLEY, 1943, 105. 
12 Ibid., 111. 
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moved to action. Beyond the rhetoric and idealism of the Delanys, Turners 
and Garveys, African-Americans took practical steps to help defend an inde-
pendent African nation. In what ways did they contribute to this defense? 
The Basis of African-American Solidarity 
The African-American response to the Italian invasion was influenced by 
the unique role Ethiopia played in their world view.13 Ethiopia was a sym-
bol of black achievement, having retained virtually intact its ancient institu-
tions; but under the circumstance of a worldwide downturn in the status of 
the Negro, it was also a symbol of racial pride and hope. Africa had fea-
tured prominently in the nationalist-emigrationist plans of African-
Americans, but in most cases such schemes were directed toward West Af-
rica, especially Liberia and not to Ethiopia. There were, however, some few 
cases in which Ethiopia was seen as the place of return, as, for example, the 
cases of W.H. Ellis of 1903 and that of Rabbi Arnold Josiah Ford who 
aimed to establish a settlement near Lake Tana in Ethiopia.14 While there 
was no successful mass back-to-Ethiopia movement, there was a black 
American community established in Ethiopia by individual migrants. This 
community by the early 1930s had over one hundred African-Americans.15 
Indications are that Ethiopians on their part were willing to accept return-
ing African-Americans. For example, Azzaŝ WÃrqnÃh ŭŀÃte (otherwise 
Martin), the Ethiopian ambassador to the court of St. James, was sent to 
America in 1927 to encourage needed black professionals and technicians to 
settle in Ethiopia.16 The Chicago Defender of December, 1935, reprinted 
excerpts from a letter purportedly written by Crown Prince Johannes (sic!) 
in 1909 for his father, Emperor Menelik, in which the emperor promised to 
reserve six million acres in the Land of Judah for New World blacks willing 
to return home. There is no evidence that African-Americans heeded or 
took advantage of this call and opportunity. A very visible exception was 
Colonel Hubert Fauntleroy Julian, the ߇Black Eagle of Harlem߈, who went 
to serve in Ethiopia before the War of 1935.17 For most African-Americans 
that thought of Ethiopia, their interest was sentimental rather than emigra-
tionist. From the moment Italian aggression against Ethiopia became a pos-
sibility, this sentimental interest took on a strong racial activist character. 
 
13 See ERHAGBE, 2006, 152߃154 for a discussion of African-American perception of 
Ethiopia. 
14 WEISBORD, 1973, 90߃94. 
15 OTTLEY, 1943, states that several hundreds resettled in Ethiopia: 107. 
16 WEISBORD, 1973, 92. 
17 BULLOCH, 1964, 81߃91. 
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African-American Response to the Italian Invasion:   
The Practical Dimension 
African-American intellectuals and press had created the ideological plat-
form on which stood the diverse organizations and efforts that emerged in 
defense of Ethiopia. As early as December 1934, the Ethiopian Research 
Council had been established at Howard University in Washington, D.C., 
directed by Professors W. Leo Hansberry, an anthropologist, and Ralph 
Bunche, then a professor of politics at Howard University. It was set up 
ߋfor the purpose of disseminating information on the history, civilization 
and diplomatic relations of Ethiopia in Ancient and Modern Timesߌ.18 A 
similar association set up at Wilberforce University in Ohio hoped, accord-
ing to the Pittsburgh Courier, ߋto aid in the preservation of the territorial 
integrity and political sovereignty of the kingdom of Abyssinia, to spread 
information and helpful propaganda in its interest, to petition the govern-
ment of the United States to use its good offices to the end that the differ-
ences between Italy and Abyssinia may be settled by arbitration.19 
African-American media organizations as the crisis unfolded had called 
on the international community, particularly the League, to intervene to 
stop a probable Italian invasion. The Opportunist, for example, in its edito-
rial of May 1935 bemoaned the failure of the tri-power conference in Paris 
and heaped its hope on the meeting of the League scheduled for early Sep-
tember, warning of the conflagration that may result from a failure to re-
strain Italy. ߋIf the League failsߌ, it concluded, ߋthen war is inevitableߌ.20 In 
spite of this apparently neutral and pacifist position, the African-American 
perspective on the crisis was racial. Thus, in another editorial of July 1935, 
The Opportunist reiterated the black man߈s solidarity with Ethiopia warn-
ing of the possible consequence an Italian attack on Ethiopia might have for 
the ߇Nordic Race߈. It argued that although Ethiopia was not a Negro nation 
ߋaccording to strict adherence to current ethnological definitionsߌ, it had 
become the ߋspiritual fatherland of Negroes throughout the world, and 
from Bahia to Birmingham, and from New York to Nigeriaߌ.21 And in 
strong pan-Africanist language, the Crisis in 1935 concluded that ߋwhen all 
is said and done, the struggles of the Abyssinians is fundamentally a part of 
the struggle of the black race the world over for national freedom, econom-
ic, political and racial emancipationߌ.22 
 
18 ROSS, 1975, 325. 
19 Pittsburgh Courier, March 9, 1935, Section 2, 1. 
20 The Opportunity ߃ The Official Newspaper of the National Urban League, May 1935, 
editorial page. 
21 Ibid., September 1935, 230. 
22 Crisis 42, 8, 1935, 214. 
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The Italian threat to Ethiopia led to the establishment of ad hoc organi-
zations whose main purpose was to help preserve Ethiopian independence. 
In the course of the crisis, some of these organizations dissolved, while oth-
ers merged. In the main, they hoped to mobilize money, arms and ammuni-
tion, and medical supplies for Ethiopia. In addition, they also aimed at in-
fluencing United States foreign policy for the benefit of Ethiopia. These 
organizations were not always established by African-Americans, some 
were the handiwork of white American liberals and pacifists. An indication 
of the kind of support these organizations hoped to render Ethiopia could 
be seen in the resolutions adopted at a mass rally held in March 1935, under 
the auspices of the Provisional Committee for the Defense of Ethiopia. 
These included 
1. Ethiopia needs money, arms and munitions rather than manpower. 
2. Resolutions of protest to be sent to Mussolini, League of Nations, Secre-
tary of State, and Mayor of New York. 
3. A 50,000 person parade will be held in Harlem soon. 
4. Harlemites spend no money where it might find its way to Italian fascists 
to be used ߋto stab our brothers in the backߌ.23 
These standpoints remained the main rallying points for support of Ethi-
opia. Other angles that were added included organizing special prayers for 
Ethiopia; and, although not successful, organizing volunteers from the Afri-
can-American community who were willing to go to Ethiopia to fight. 
The active organizations that were established to help Ethiopia included 
the American Committee on the Ethiopia Crisis, and American Aid for Ethi-
opia ߃ these were multi-racial groups dominated by white liberals. African-
Americans formed the core of organizations such as Friends of Ethiopia, the 
Medical Committee for the Defense of Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Emergency 
Medical Aid, and United Aid for Ethiopia. Outside of these new organiza-
tions older organizations in the African-American community such as the 
Pan-African Reconstruction Association based in New York also came to the 
aid of Ethiopia. The mass of African-Americans, especially in New York, 
attended rallies and demonstrations organized by these groups. 
In certain cases individuals such as Samuel Daniels, President of the Pan-
African Reconstruction Association, and Harold H. Williams, a representa-
tive of the Ethiopian League of America, campaigned for volunteers who 
were willing to come to the military defense of Ethiopia. As reported in the 
Afro-American on July 6, Daniels and Williams set out on a nationwide  
tour to recruit volunteers for Abyssinia.24 Although by mid-July Daniels 
 
23 Amsterdam News, March 9, 1935, 1. 
24 Afro-American (Baltimore), July 6, 1935, 10. 
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boasted that he had signed up over 17,500 volunteers, made up of volun-
teers from Boston (200), Detroit (5,000), Chicago (8,000), Kansas City, 
Missouri (2,000), Philadelphia (1,500), and New York (850), these volun-
teers never succeeded in going to Ethiopia.25 He reputedly charged a mini-
mum of 25 cents per enlistment as a private and higher sum for commis-
sioned and non-commissioned officer positions.26 The failure of these vol-
unteers to depart for Ethiopia could be attributed to the fact that there was 
lack of money to transport them to Ethiopia. It was calculated that it would 
cost at least one thousand dollars to send a volunteer to Ethiopia, and con-
sidering the total amount of money that the Ethiopian support groups 
could collect, they could not meet the cost.27 In addition, United States law 
prevented Americans, including African-Americans, from enlisting as com-
batants;28 and the euphoric response, indicated even in the newspapers, did 
not necessarily mean that African-Americans that volunteered were genu-
inely prepared to actually go to Ethiopia and fight. More importantly,  
Ethiopia did not need fighting volunteers, for as ambassador Tecle 
Hawariat told an Afro-American correspondent in Geneva, ߋwe have plenty 
of native soldiers ߑ the Ethiopian soldiers can operate on much less than 
could an American recruit and know the kind of fighting that must be 
doneߌ. He even added that ߋthe cost of maintaining one American soldier 
would be far more than that of a large number of Ethiopiansߌ. He conclud-
ed by saying that what they needed were arms and ammunition.29 There 
were, however, two African-Americans who became directly involved in 
the military aspect of the conflict. These were Colonel Hubert Fauntleroy 
Julian, ߇the Black Eagle߈, a former New York aviator, and William H. Rob-
inson, ߇the Brown Condor߈, a Chicago youth and Tuskegee graduate who 
later became the head of Haile Selassie߈s airforce. 
Julian had worked in the Ethiopian air force when it was still in its in-
fancy. Although he left Ethiopia after a controversy surrounding a crash 
during an air manoeuvre honouring the Emperor, when hostilities were 
imminent he returned to Ethiopia.30 On his return to Ethiopia, he was not 
permitted to serve as a pilot; instead, he was made to drill new infantry re-
cruits. Following an altercation with the Brown Condor, Julian was sent to 
be the military governor of Ambo, a town some eighty kilometres west of 
Addis Ababa. While in this district he helped with building the defences for 
 
25 Ibid, July 20, 1935, 1. 
26 See ROSS, 1975, 332. 
27 See Ibid., 333. 
28 See the Courier, July 20, 1935, front page. 
29 Afro-American, week of September 28, 1935, 4. 
30 See BULLOCK, 1964, Chapter 9. 
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the area, but with the outbreak of actual hostilities, Julian returned to Addis 
Ababa, where he came to the conclusion that he had to leave Ethiopia since 
ߋwith the lack of weapons and ammunition, and the disorganization in the 
capital, there was no hope of stopping the well-armed and highly trained 
Italian armyߌ.31 He therefore left Ethiopia without being involved in any 
combat operation. During his period of stay, however, his very substantial 
salary was all accumulating for him in a bank in Europe.32 
Robinson turned out to be the replacement for Julian in the air force, a 
fact which must have been more responsible for the hostility between the 
two rather than the false stories which Robinson allegedly told about  
Julian.33 The Saturday, June 6, 1936 edition of the Courier carried photo-
graphs of Robinson߈s return to Chicago and reported that ߋthousands give 
߇Brown Condor߈ of Ethiopia a conquering hero߈s welcomeߌ. Upon his re-
turn to the United States, Robinson started lecturing under the auspices of 
United Aid for Ethiopia, starting with a lecture in New York on June 7, 
1936.34 
Instead of sending military volunteers to Ethiopia, most organizations 
and individuals concentrated on mobilizing medical and diplomatic aid for 
Ethiopia. One such organization was the Committee for Ethiopia headed 
by Robert F.S. Harris. On July 1, 1935, Harris sent out five thousand circu-
lars to concerned persons, especially clergymen, asking their cooperation in 
both accepting a place on his committee and contributing financially to his 
programme. The sevenfold programme of the committee included 
Molding public opinion, setting up a nationwide day of prayer, pre-
venting communist elements from taking advantage of the Italo߃
Ethiopian crisis to further their subversive propaganda and agitation 
among Americans of African descent, sending medical supplies to 
Ethiopia, and erecting a modern shortwave station in Addis Ababa.35 
Harris, having set up a 49 member executive committee, organized a peti-
tion campaign calling upon the United States to invoke the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact, by which the 63 signatories (that included Italy, Abyssinia, and the 
United States) renounced war as an instrument of national policy. To achieve 
this, he printed 235,000 circulars which he sent to various individuals and 
peace groups throughout the country. In addition to this, Harris was instru-
 
31 Ibid., 112. 
32 Ibid., 111. 
33 Ibid., 106߃107. 
34 For detailed studies of Julian and Robinson߈s activities in Ethiopia, see SCOTT, 1971, 
especially Chapters VI and VII. 
35 See ROSS, 1975, 334. 
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mental in the coordination of the August 18, 1935 prayer activities. Although 
Harris solicited medical supplies by distributing coin cards to churches 
throughout the nation, by the beginning of September he had received less 
than one hundred dollars.36 Through a donation from the Squibbs Company, 
the Committee had succeeded in late August in sending its first shipment of 
medical aid to Ethiopia on board the steamship Ingria of the Franco߃Liberian 
Line.37 By mid-October, the Committee announced that the first American 
volunteer field hospital unit consisting of a full staff of seven Negro physi-
cians and complete field equipment would be transported to Ethiopia from 
New York at a cost of five thousand dollars.38 This was not achieved, however. 
The efforts of such groups as the Ethiopian Emergency Medical Aid and 
United Aid for Ethiopia did not result in the sending of large shipments of 
medical supplies to Ethiopia. United Aid for Ethiopia seems to have col-
lected a reasonable amount of money but this was not converted into medi-
cal supplies for Ethiopia.39 The group was established in January 1936, 
through the efforts of Lij Tesfaye Zaphiro, a secretary from the Ethiopian 
legation in London. He succeeded in uniting a number of black-led Ethio-
pian aid groups into the new organization. Zaphiro raised funds through 
tours of New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Brooklyn, and Chicago, raising 
$305 from a New York Christmas Eve rally of about three thousand per-
sons at Adam Clayton Powell Sr.߈s Abyssinian Baptist Church40, and $350 
from a Brooklyn appearance.41 While in Chicago, three churches, Olivet 
Baptist Church, the Ebenezer Baptist Church and the Pilgrim Baptist 
Church collected $94.50, $106, and $100 respectively for the organization 
during Zaphiro߈s visit.42 By the end of his stay, he had raised about five 
thousand dollars for the Ethiopian cause.43 Zaphiro߈s efforts were taken 
over by Dr. Malaku Bayen, a cousin and personal physician to the emperor. 
Bayen came to the United States with his wife to coordinate all relief efforts 
on behalf of Ethiopia, and this led him to establish the Ethiopia World Fed-
eration, Inc., after working initially with the United Aid to Ethiopia.44 Al-
 
36 Ibid., 335. 
37 Ibid., 340. 
38 Courier, October 19, 1935. 
39 SCOTT, 1971, 251. 
40 New York Times, December 25, 1935, 3. See also PLUMMER,1996, 52. 
41 New York Age, February 22, 1936, 7. 
42 Chicago Defender, February 1, 1936, 12. 
43 PLUMMER, 1996, 52. 
44 For a detailed discussion of the career of Dr. Malaku Bayen in the United States, see 
SCOTT, 1971, Chapter 8. The Ethiopian World Federation, Inc. became a national organ-
ization with broad political objectives, but concerned itself largely with aiding the  
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though the Federation worked hard to rekindle widespread interest among 
African-Americans in the plight of Ethiopia, it did not succeed better than 
previous organizations in sending aid to Ethiopia. In the years of Ethiopia߈s 
embattlement, the organization that made a fairly tangible contribution to 
its cause was the Medical Committee for the Defense of Ethiopia, later in-
corporated into the United Aid for Ethiopia. 
The New York Times reported on September 10, 1935, that in New York 
City, the Medical Committee for the Defense of Ethiopia (MCDE), a pre-
dominantly black group composed of thirty physicians, dentists, pharma-
cists, nurses and technicians, had announced an energetic drive to send im-
mediate medical assistance to the Ethiopian people.45 The group was led by 
Dr. J.J. Jones, Dr. P.M.H. Savory, and Dr. Arnold Donawa. On October 
26, 1935, the MCDE came up with an advertisement asking those wishing 
to make contributions to send cash, bandages or materials which could be 
made into bandages to the MCDE߈s headquarters at the United Negro Im-
provement Association building, 36 West 135 Street.46 It was reported in the 
New York Age on November 30 that Dr. Donawa had informed the press 
ߋthat two tons of recently shipped medical and surgical supplies had arrived 
in Ethiopiaߌ.47 The Courier reported on January 18, 1936 that the MCDE 
had launched a campaign to purchase medical equipment to replace the 
hospital unit destroyed by Italian invaders when they attacked Dessye on 
December 6, 1935. By January 13, 1936 it reported that on December 31, a 
field hospital unit was shipped to Ethiopia via the S.S. Steel Age of the 
Isthmian Steamship Lines. This shipment, which constituted the main trans-
fer of aid to Ethiopia from African-Americans during the war, included nine 
tons of bandages and sterilized dressings.48 
African-Americans cooperated with white-dominated groups that sym-
pathized and organised aid for Ethiopia. Willis Huggins, who had set up the 
Friends of Ethiopia in October 1935, joined the Executive Committee of 
American Aid for Ethiopia by December 1935. Some groups never got af-
 
thousands of Ethiopian refugees living in Kenya, Uganda, Egypt, Palestine and else-
where. The Federation established branches in other cities outside of New York, and had 
a weekly organ called the Voice of Ethiopia, which ߋwas rabidly pro-Negro as well as 
pro-Ethiopiaߌ: OTTLEY, 1943, 110. In assessing Bayen߈s efforts before his death on May 
4, 1940, Scott points out that he was succeeding in ߋrekindling widespread interest 
among black Americans in the plight of Ethiopia and effecting a greater understanding 
between some of his countrymen and Afro-Americansߌ: SCOTT, 1971, 284. 
45 New York Times September 10, 1935, 13. 
46 New York Age, October 26, 1935, 1. 
47 Ibid., November 30, 1935. 
48 Courier, January 18, 1936, Section 1,3. 
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filiated to the white groups, but still cooperated with them. For example, 
the Pan-African Reconstruction Association instructed its female members 
to help prepare the bandages that the American Aid for Ethiopia sent to 
Ethiopia.49 The willingness of the various Ethiopian interest groups to co-
operate was demonstrated by the fact that several such groups jointly sent 
Dr. Willis N. Huggins to Geneva to argue their case. Huggins, representing 
the Provisional Committee for the Defense of Ethiopia, the Committee on 
Ethiopia, and the American League Against War and Fascism, carried a 
petition urging that the League of Nations take measures to restrain Italy, 
assure Ethiopia of the League߈s support, and send a neutral commission to 
Ethiopia to report on boundary disputes.50 
Apart from the new groups that were established specifically for the de-
fense of Ethiopia, older existing groups with interests in the African-
American community also lent their solidarity to the Ethiopian cause. Hence 
American churches condemned the invasion.51 At the 68th session of the Pitts-
burgh American Methodist Episcopal conference, the Methodists condemned 
the Italian action and called on the League to protect ߋthe oldest and most 
peaceful Christian nation in the worldߌ. It resolved among other things ߋthat 
the darker peoples of the world, of whatever religious faith, be entreated to 
refuse to do anything either of moral or material or even spiritual nature to 
assist this tyrant to subjugate a Christian people to satisfy his lust for greedߌ.52 
African-American churches observed August 18, 1935 as a day of prayer for 
Ethiopia. This day was observed by over 3,000 congregations in America and 
the West Indies.53 Special hymns were composed for the Ethiopian cause. A 
new Ethiopian marching song composed for the special services devoted to 
Ethiopia at the Zion Baptist Church took Los Angeles Ethiopian enthusiasts 
by storm.54 It was also reported later that a Negro Church in Indianapolis 
remained open all night and made it possible for pedestrians to enter, kneel, 
and pray for the safety of Ethiopia.55  
The National Association for the Advancement of Coloured Peoples 
(NAACP) was another long-established organization in the African-
American community that came to the aid of Ethiopia by denouncing Ital-
 
49 New York Times, November 27, 1935, 13. 
50 Afro-American (Baltimore), July 27, 1935, 7. 
51 For example, the Courier carried a news item on its church page of August 31, 1935, 
headlined ߋChurchmen Denounce Mussolini War Policyߌ. 
52 Ibid., October 5, 1935, church section. 
53 Ibid., August 3, 1935, church section; and the Afro-American (Baltimore), August 24, 
1935, 7. 
54 Afro-American (Baltimore), August 24, 1935, 7. 
55 Ibid., September 21, 1935. 
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ian aggression. The NAACP, in its 26 Annual Confab held at St. Louis, 
unequivocally condemned ߋItalian aggression in Ethiopia and the imperial-
ist selfishness of all nations in their shameless aggression upon the sover-
eignty of other nationsߌ and vigorously urged ߋthe President and the De-
partment of State to voice publicly their disapproval of the Italian govern-
ment߈s action in Ethiopiaߌ.56 A front page report in the Courier of Decem-
ber 21, 1935 informed its readers that the NAACP had sent a cable to the 
League denouncing ߋthe peace proposal advanced for the settlement of the 
Italian߃Ethiopian warߌ branding it as ߋa robber proposal rewarding shame-
less aggression of Italyߌ.  
The various ad hoc groups, as well as the established groups with pacifist 
interests, and those working in the interest of African-Americans, lent their 
support to Ethiopia. Their combined efforts did not improve the chances of 
Haile Selassie defending his empire, especially as their efforts were directed 
more towards medical relief than military assistance. The existence of such 
groups with functioning offices gave some African-Americans the oppor-
tunity to express in practical terms their positive sentiments of sympathy 
toward the Ethiopian cause. Even without monetary or military contribu-
tions, the mass of African-Americans had another outlet for demonstrating 
their solidarity with Ethiopia. They showed this solidarity through demon-
strations against Mussolini in the United States and through the boycott of 
Italian stores. The Courier on August 10, 1935 reported a mass parade of 
twenty thousand in Harlem demanding peace and excoriating Italy and 
Mussolini for their war-like advances against Ethiopia. Another report indi-
cated that three hundred Ethiopian sympathizers were jailed in Chicago 
after a planned demonstration against Mussolini was broken up.57 Clashes 
between African-Americans and Italian-Americans in Brooklyn and Harlem 
on October 4 attracted one thousand New York City policemen.58 Added 
to these demonstrations were attacks on Italian-Americans and the boycott 
of their shops, especially in predominantly African-American communi-
ties.59 The Afro-American carried a report on October 12, 1935 that ߇Down 
with Italian Merchants߈ was the cry of Ethiopian sympathizers in New 
York when a drive was launched to force Italian-Americans out of Har-
lem.60 These activities threatened Harlem and Chicago and got to such a 
peak that the Rev. Senior Powell opposed Harlem attacks upon Italians 
 
56 Courier, July 13, 1935, Section 2, 3. 
57 Ibid. 
58 PLUMMER, 1996, 50. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Afro-American, October 12, 1935, 12. 
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remarking that ߋstore owners are hanging out signs announcing that they 
are not Italians as the differences between this nationality and coloured 
Americans are growing into something of a menace as a result of the war in 
Africaߌ.61 Another paper reported that ߋup in Harlem, Italian fruit vendors 
and ice men were feeling the reprisals of the kinsmen of the Ethiopians 
along economic lines if in no other wayߌ.62 The same paper also reported 
the news that ߋpickets put ߇Blood߈ at the Italian consulate great building to 
give dramatic realism to the protests of anti-war pickets against Mussolini߈s 
war of plunder against the Ethiopiansߌ.63 Chicago, with its growing Afri-
can-American population, witnessed similar protests. In some of these cit-
ies, especially the Harlem section of New York City, news reports about 
the war in Ethiopia increasingly affected the relationship between African-
Americans and their Italian-American compatriots.64 
Discordant Voices in the African-American Community 
Generally therefore, it can be argued that there was obvious sympathy 
backed by action on the part of African-Americans with Ethiopia. The 
point must be made, however, that there were some discordant voices in the 
African-American community who did not feel any obligation to help, 
voices which called on their compatriots to concentrate on their own prob-
lems in the United States. Surprisingly, even the Courier, which was later to 
be in the vanguard for mobilizing aid for Ethiopia, echoed this provincial 
sentiment. In an editorial of Saturday, July 20, 1935, entitled ߇Helping  
Ethiopia߈, the paper examined the needs of Ethiopia and identified the send-
ing of money to be the most viable way African-Americans could help 
Ethiopia. It went on to say, however, that  
Aframerica has a war on its hands ߃ a war that has been going on for 
generations. It is a war against discrimination, segregation, disenfran-
chisement, illiteracy, ignorance, shiftlessness, peonage, ruthless ex-
ploitation, bad housing and bad health. It needs every dollar it can 
spare in this war right here.65  
It further contended that aid that could be sent to Ethiopia could be used 
instead to give scholarships to African-American children to attend the 
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology or Howard Medical School; to build 
one thousand playgrounds with swimming pools; and to win school segre-
gation cases. The editorial concluded, 
Much as we all sympathize with Ethiopia, it is evident that our bur-
dens here are sufficiently heavy without assuming those of Negroes 
over 7,000 miles away. It is noteworthy that, while our disabilities 
have been fairly well publicized throughout the world since emanci-
pation, no aid has ever come from our brethren across the seas. We 
have fought our battle alone and they will have to do likewise.66 
In spite of this earlier editorial, the Courier became one of the main in-
struments for mobilizing African-American support for Ethiopia. An ex-
planation for this change of heart is the reality of Italian invasion which in 
July 1935 was still just a possibility, and more importantly, the paper might 
have been responding to the seeming dominant sentiment in the African-
American community, which was that of doing something to help Ethiopia. 
Although the majority of African-Americans were dealing with the prob-
lems caused by the Great Depression, the newspapers, intellectuals and 
various established organizations in the African-American community seem 
to have been more inclined toward the sentiment of doing something to 
help Ethiopia. But the earlier sentiment expressed by the Courier was still 
there in the community. In a letter to the Afro-American, one reader from 
Annapolis, Maryland expressed such a feeling. 
I sympathize with Ethiopia one hundred percent but in view of the 
many ills and misfortunes that confront us here I cannot understand 
why some of those red-blooded volunteers don߈t advocate improving 
our own situation before going abroad.67 
In addition to the fact that problems of African-Americans sometimes 
caused some not to want to identify with Ethiopia, one particular issue also 
worked against their unity on behalf of Ethiopia. This was the question of 
whether Ethiopia was actually a Negro nation. 
Ottley points out that ߋrumors that the Ethiopians were not Negroes 
nearly ended the unity of black men in this country with those in Africaߌ.68 
Mussolini߈s supporters tried to point out to African-Americans that since 
the Ethiopians and their Emperor did not consider themselves Negroes 
there was no basis for African-American sympathy. African-American 
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newspapers had to counter this allegation and described it as an attempt to 
fool African-Americans and not to help Ethiopia.69 The papers carried arti-
cles and stories to show that the Ethiopians were Negroid.70 Dr. Maluku 
Bayen, an indigenous Ethiopian, who arrived in the United States in 1936 as 
the Emperor߈s official representative, ߋattempted to counteract such propa-
ganda with the explanation that the Ethiopians reject the term Negro be-
cause of its connotation of slavery. But this, he added, did not prevent the 
Ethiopians from aligning themselves with American Negroes in blood 
brotherhood because of common ancestryߌ.71 Ottley also indicates that 
when Dr. Huggins went abroad before the outbreak of war, he had ߋvisited 
the Chief Ethiopian legations to check the ߇racial classification߈ of the Ethi-
opiansߌ.72 Huggins from his inquiry reported that ߋthe emperor is very 
conscious of the fact that he is today the only Black Sovereign in the world, 
and he considers himself as the natural leader of the (black) Negro raceߌ, 
and that the emperor ߋis fond of repeating the phrase that ߇Ethiopia is the 
trustee for the future of the black races߈ߌ.73 
While it is impossible to assess the damage this propaganda might have 
done to positive responses from African-Americans to the Ethiopian call for 
help, there is no doubt that it was a threat to the Ethiopian cause, hence, 
editors and feature writers painstakingly devoted time and space to assert-
ing the blackness of Ethiopians.74 We find that even in his appeal for help 
from African-Americans, Zaphiro had to emphasize that there was a decid-
ed blood relationship between Negroes and his people. Assessing the dam-
age the propaganda had done to the cause of supporting Ethiopia, he de-
clared: ߋit appears that this racial controversy is responsible to a marked 
degree, for the present state of confusion, which can be attributed to the 
lack of cooperation to aid Ethiopia in her hour of needߌ. He concluded the 
appeal by pointing out that ߋEthiopia needs our support ߑ in order to pre-
serve her independence and freedom and thus maintain the oldest and only 
black empire in the worldߌ.75 Although this controversy continued there is 
no evidence that it actually stifled whatever help African-Americans were 
capable of giving to Ethiopia. 
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Conclusion 
The fact that African-Americans, in spite of their distance from Africa, re-
sponded so vigorously to developments in Ethiopia between 1935 and 1936 
is testimony to their African consciousness. Whether for positive or nega-
tive reasons, African-Americans had to occasionally look toward Africa and 
developments in the continent. Although among the intellectuals and other 
members of the middle class there was an awareness of developments in the 
continent, the Italo߃Ethiopian crisis was the first major event which galva-
nized both the masses and their leaders into working for an African cause. 
The remarkable nature of their efforts stems from the following facts: 
First, many years had separated African-Americans from Africa, unlike 
most Italian-Americans who had just recently left their home country and 
still bore Italian names; but in spite of this African-Americans still identified 
with African interests in the continent. Second, African-Americans still had 
weighty problems to contend with in the United States. Thus, the fact that 
they found time and energy to help their distant cousins in Ethiopia was 
remarkable. And third, evidence shows that most African-Americans at this 
time were still very poor, with the population in the ghettoes swelling con-
stantly. This was the period of the Great Depression which led to a wor-
sening of the living conditions of the poor, a class dominated by African-
Americans. Their poverty did not however stop them from contributing 
their cents to those organizations that worked toward mobilizing medical 
aid for Ethiopia. Fourth, there was even the controversy of whether Ethio-
pians were actually Negroes or if they even considered themselves as having 
any racial solidarity with other Africans. In these circumstances, therefore, 
the orchestrated campaigns by African-Americans to help the Ethiopian 
cause cannot but be appreciated. The Ethiopian monarch recognized the 
possible contributions African-Americans could make towards his cause, 
hence he sent envoys to campaign for their support. Ethiopia fell not be-
cause of the lack of support from African-Americans or lack of willingness 
on the part of Ethiopians to defend their empire, but because of the military 
superiority of Italy and the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations which, 
because of the selfish interests of the two major members, France and Brit-
ain, refused to come to the aid of Ethiopia. As Dr. Huggins, under the aus-
pices of the International Council of Friends of Ethiopia, prophetically 
warned the League of Nations in 1935, the Fascist destruction of Ethiopia 
did put the peace of the world in peril,76 a situation which a decisive action 
of the League of Nations could have helped to prevent.77 
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The campaign by African-Americans to help Ethiopia constituted their 
first major practical demonstration in the international arena of the African-
American consciousness of their solidarity with the black race throughout 
the world. African-Americans were therefore responding to a development 
in Africa, trying to defend the independence of an African nation. As Floyd 
J. Galvin stated in a report in the Courier, ߋfor the first time in the history 
of America, the Negro citizen has a burning interest in the international 
policy of his countryߌ.78 In the same vein, John Hope Franklin in his later 
assessment of the crisis, states that with the invasion of Ethiopia, ߋalmost 
overnight, even the most provincial among American Negroes became in-
ternationally mindedߌ.79 The political horizon of African-Americans was 
broadened, a result which Marcus Garvey and W.E.B. Du Bois had, in their 
respective ways, worked for.  
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Summary 
In a world where the Negro groped for recognition, Ethiopia (Abyssinia), with its an-
cient institutions and sovereignty virtually intact, was a symbol of racial pride and 
achievement. This Ethiopia was however invaded by Italy in 1935. It was a racial inter-
pretation that the Negro world gave the Italian invasion. African-American interest in 
Africa which hitherto had been romantic and sentimental, with the Italian invasion be-
came practical, and in this case designed to strengthen Ethiopian resistance. In the end, 
African-American contribution, though symbolically significant, was paltry. This can be 
accounted for by the relative poverty of African-Americans, and the time and cultural 
distance separating them from Africa. 
